Mechanisms of Morality: Sources of Support of Humanitarian Intervention
Supplementary Appendix

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Appendix A. Theoretical Mechanisms of Morality[1]

Foundations	Moral Values	Associated Traits	Indicator
Individualizing	Harm/ Care	Concern for the suffering of others, compassion, caring for others and protecting them	Whether or not harm would be done to weak or vulnerable civilians.
	Fairness/ Reciprocity	Individuals should be treated with equal concern and respect, inequality is unfair and unjust	Whether or not the perpetrators would be able to get away with violating human rights.
Community/ Binding	Authority/ Respect	Maintenance of social hierarchies to assure social order, obedience, respect, role fulfillment	Whether or not the invading country's actions caused disorder within international society.
	Ingroup/ Loyalty	Obligations to group to preserve cohesion against out-groups	Whether or not a failure to respond would betray my country's values and identity.
	Purity/ Sanctity	Admonitions to maintain bodily and spiritual cleanliness	Whether or not the invading country's actions violate my expectations for how a civilized country should act.

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[1] Values and language for the first three columns are drawn from Kertzer et al. (2014, 829).

Appendix B. Public Support for Potential Post-Cold War Interventions, 1990-2014

The measure of average public opinion prior to and during the intervention includes survey questions from the Roper Center's iPoll database that directly asked respondents whether they favored or opposed a military action that was either proposed or carried out.

B1. Potential Interventions and Average Public Support

Case	Motivating Concern	Type of Force	Average Public Opinion Prior to Intervention (Favor %)	Average Public Opinion During Intervention (Favor%)
Gulf War (1991)	Security	Ground, Air	69%	79%
Northern Watch (1991-2003)	Humanitarian	Air	--[2]	69%
Somalia (1992-1993)	Humanitarian	Ground, Air	72%	70%
North Korea (1993-1994)	Security	N/A	51%	No Intervention
Rwanda (1994)	Humanitarian	N/A	47 %[3] 37%[4] 69%[5]	No Intervention
Haiti (1994)	Security	Naval Embargo, Ground	26%	38%
Bosnia (1994-1995)	Humanitarian	Air	51%	50%[6] 39%[7]
Kosovo (1999)	Humanitarian	Air	51%	57%
Afghanistan (2001-2014)	Security	Ground, Air	75%	85% (10/07/2001-12/09/2001) 50% (12/10/2001-2014)
Iraq (2003-2010)	Security	Ground, Air	75%	50%
Sudan: Darfur (2003-2008)	Humanitarian	N/A	49%	No Intervention
Libya (2011)	Humanitarian	Air	51%	55%
Syria (2013)	Humanitarian	Air (proposed)	39%	No Intervention
Iraq/Syria/ISIL (2014)	Security	Air	49%	68%

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[2] Because the Northern Watch operation immediately followed the end of the Gulf War, we have thus far not come across direct poll questions that address support for this operation prior to its initiation.
[3] Combined support for use of force to stop the killing and to provide aid.
[4] Support for the use of force to stop the killing.
[5] Support for the use of force to provide aid.
[6] Air support for NATO operations.
[7] Direct strikes and contribution of forces to SFOR.

B2. Public Support for Potential Post-Cold War Interventions

Levels of public support for all post-Cold War instances of proposed and actual intervention. Source: Roper Center iPoll Database.

Appendix C. Experiment One

C1. Experiment One Survey Instrument[8]

The following survey was fielded September 1-2, 2014, with 330 participants recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

Background information given to all respondents.

We are going to describe a situation the United States could face in the future. For scientific validity, the situation is general, and is not about a specific country in the news today.[9] After describing the situation, we will ask a few questions.

Control Group
An authoritarian leader abroad has deployed troops to a neighboring country.
The neighbor is unable to defend itself. The U.S. president has called for
the U.S. military to intervene to expel the invaders. To what extent would you
support or oppose this intervention?

Strongly support / Somewhat support / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose[10]

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[8] The experimental treatments are designed to compare respondents' support for humanitarian interventions with a baseline that reflects interventions such as the 1991 Gulf War and the foreign policy restraint (FPR) scenario presented by Jentleson (1992, 50) in which military force restrains an adversary from aggressive action. The security interests involved in foreign policy restraint may include protecting U.S. citizens, allies, economic interests, or shared basic values. While the FPR scenario does not invoke a direct connection to U.S. national security, the U.S. has an interest in preventing acts of international aggression and historically condemns aggressive invasions of other countries through escalatory policies that heighten the potential for military action. Furthermore, because respondents are informed that the U.S. president is calling for an intervention, they are more likely to assume that the conflict is of relevance to the United States and worthy of presidential attention.

[9] We use a hypothetical scenario because it allows us to maximize internal validity and mitigate concerns about confounders associated with respondents' views of the current president or current military interventions. Additionally, we present a scenario that does not tell respondents the costs of the intervention for two reasons: 1) we are interested in the mechanisms through which support for humanitarian intervention functions and thus aim to examine the reasons behind support when it exists rather than factors that dampen support; and 2) testing the cost aspect of the instrumental logic requires measuring the costs respondents independently associate with an intervention rather than providing this information as part of the scenario.

[10] Support was measured on a four-point scale. We collapsed the scale into a binary measure of support (including "strongly support" and "somewhat support") or oppose (including "strongly oppose" and "somewhat oppose"). The percentages reported in the tables and figures for all three experiments refer to this binary measure.

The instrument involved a single humanitarian intervention treatment group, which received the following prompt.

Treatment Group
An authoritarian leader abroad has deployed troops to a neighboring country. The neighbor is unable to defend its civilians. The U.S. president has called for the U.S. military to intervene because civilians, many of whom are women and children, are systematically being massacred. To what extent would you support or oppose this intervention?

Strongly support / Somewhat support / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose

All respondents were then asked the following questions.

Norms Mediators
Moral Obligation[11]
To what extent do you agree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?

Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Somewhat disagree / Strongly disagree

Cost Signals
Burden-Sharing
If the United States intervenes, how likely is it that other countries would help the U.S. carry out the operation?

Very unlikely / Unlikely / 50-50 Chance / Likely / Very likely

Financial Cost
If the U.S. intervenes, how much money do you think the mission will cost the U.S. government? (please give your best guess in billions of dollars)

Less than $20 billion / Between $21 and $40 billion / Between $41 and $60 billion / Between $61 and $80 billion / Between $81 and $100 billion / Over $100 billion

Risk of Casualties
If the U.S. intervenes, how many American casualties do you think there will be?

No casualties / A low number of casualties (less than 100) / A moderate number of casualties (about 200) / A high number of casualties (more than 300)

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[11] Questions about morality create the potential for social desirability bias—respondents could report feeling a false sense of moral obligation because they believe this is the good and right thing to do. However, the online survey format mitigates this concern because respondents remained anonymous and did not directly interact with the researchers (Krueter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008). Additionally, to the extent that social desirability influenced respondents, it would bias against the significant differences we find between the humanitarian and FPR groups.

Strategic Signals
If the United States does NOT intervene, what are the chances that each of
the following events will occur?

- America's reputation for resolve will suffer, making it more difficult to achieve future foreign policy goals.
- American security interests will suffer because of a spillover of violence into neighboring countries.
- American security interests will suffer because instability will create a breeding ground for terrorists.
- American economic interests will suffer because of potential disruptions to energy resources.

Very unlikely / Unlikely / 50-50 Chance / Likely / Very likely

Altruism
In the last twelve months, have you done any of the following? (Check any that apply)
- Donated money to charity
- Volunteered your time
- Helped raise awareness for a good cause

Hawkishness
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world.
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Attention to Politics
How often do you get your news about politics from TV, radio, newspaper, or online outlets?
- A couple of times a month or less
- Once a week
- 2-3 times a week
- Daily
- Several times a day

Gender
What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Education
What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?
- None or grades 1-8
- High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
- High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
- Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school
- Some college, no 4-year degree (including 2 year Associate Degree)
- College graduate (BS, BA, or other 4-year degree)
- Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college

Party Identification
Generally speaking, when it comes to political parties in the United States, how would you best describe yourself?
- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat
- Independent close to Democrat
- Independent (close to neither)
- Independent close to Republican
- Not very strong Republican
- Strong Republican

Income
For statistical purposes, last year (2013) what was your total household income from all sources, before taxes?
- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 to under $20,000
- $20,000 to under $30,000
- $30,000 to under $40,000
- $40,000 to under $50,000
- $50,000 to under $75,000
- $75,000 to under $100,000
- $100,000 to under $150,000
- $150,000 or more

C2. Experiment One Sample Demographics (MTurk)

Variable	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Party ID[12]		
Democrat	170	54.14%
Independent	77	24.52%
Republican	66	21.02%
Education[13]		
High School	50	15.92%
College	223	71.02%
Post-Graduate	41	13.06%
Gender		
Male	189	60.38%
Female	124	39.62%
Income		
Low	122	38.98%
Middle	148	47.28%
High	43	13.74%
	N=314	

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[12] Independents are coded as respondents who identified as independent and close to neither Democrat nor Republican. Respondents who leaned Democrat or Republican were included in the respective party; however, the results are robust to the measurement of party identification. Additionally, while there are a significant number of Independents in our samples—25%, 30%, and 20%, respectively—these proportions are in line with recent polls that demonstrate the number of Independents in the U.S. is on the rise; see Jones (2015).

[13] Based on the highest level of education the respondent entered.

C3. Experiment One Support for FPR and Humanitarian Intervention

Note: Estimates are based on a sample of 314 respondents, 154 of whom received the control condition and 160 the humanitarian treatment. 95% confidence intervals shown.

C4. Experiment One Comparison of Binary and Categorical Measures of Support

Descriptive Comparison of Binary and Categorical Support by Treatment Scenario

	Foreign Policy Restraint	Humanitarian Intervention	Effect of Humanitarian Intervention
Binary Support			
0: Oppose	47%	20%	-27%
1: Support	53%	80%	+27%
Categorical Support			
1: Strongly Oppose	13%	4%	-9%
2: Somewhat Oppose	34%	16%	-18%
3: Somewhat Support	41%	51%	+10%
4: Strongly Support	12%	29%	+17%
N	154	160	

Binary and Categorical Comparison of Means by Treatment Scenario

	Foreign Policy Restraint	Humanitarian Intervention	Effect of Humanitarian Intervention
Binary Support	0.53	0.80	0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Categorical Support	2.51	3.04	0.53***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)
N	154	160	

Table reports results of two-tailed comparisons of means. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

C5. Experiment One Mediation Analysis

The results included in the table below are based on Hicks and Tingley's (2011) "mediation" package for Stata. We analyze each potential mechanism in separate models. The package uses a potential outcomes framework to calculate how much of the treatment variable travels through each mediating variable. Output includes the average causal mediation effect of the mediator— the average difference in outcomes between respondents in the treatment condition where the mediator is present versus respondents in the treatment condition where the mediator is absent— and the percentage of the total effect transmitted by each mediator. This approach allows us to determine whether potential mechanisms significantly mediate support for intervention and to assess the relative influence of each mechanism.

The table reports the results from mediation analysis based on the following two models, where M_i represents the observed presence or absence of the mediator, T_i is a binary indicator for the humanitarian treatment, and Y_i is the observed support or opposition to intervention. These models do not contain any pretreatment covariates as controls.

$$M_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 T_i + \epsilon_{i1}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 T_i + \beta_3 M_i + \epsilon_{i2}$$

Results of Mediation Analysis without Controls

Mechanism	Treatment Effect	Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME)	% of Total Effect Mediated
Moral Obligation	20.8%***	0.121 (0.055, 0.181)	43.8%
Burden-Sharing	15.2%**	0.046 (-0.003, 0.101)	13.5%
High Casualties	-3.9%	0.004 (-0.009, 0.022)	1.5%
Financial Costs	-2.4%	0.006 (-0.009, 0.025)	2.3%
Terrorism	-0.5%	-0.003 (-0.044, 0.034)	-1.3%†
Spillover	-0.4%	-0.006 (-0.044, 0.031)	-2.8%†
Economic Loss	3.3%	0.007 (-0.032, 0.044)	2.4%
Reputation	5.6%	0.013 (-0.024, 0.049)	4.8%

Analysis conducted on each mediator individually using the procedure from Hicks and Tingley (2011) and regression models without pretreatment control variables.
95% confidence intervals in parentheses. NB: * denotes p< .1; ** p<.05; and *** p< .01.
†Some values are negative because the effect of the mediator acts in the opposite direction of the effect of the humanitarian treatment.

As a robustness check and a caution against potential violations of the sequential ignorability assumption (Imai et al. 2011, 770), we also ran the mediation analysis with models that include a battery of observed pretreatment covariates as controls. The variables measure characteristics that could theoretically affect both an individual's response to the treatment and the presence of the relevant mediator. Controls include indicators of altruism, hawkishness, and attention to politics, as well as demographic factors such as gender, education, and party identification (see survey instrument). The table below reports the results of mediation analysis based on the following two models, where M_i represents the observed presence or absence of the mediator, T_i is a binary indicator for the humanitarian treatment, X_i is the vector of pretreatment controls, and Y_i is the observed support or opposition to intervention.

$$M_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 X_i + \epsilon_{i1}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_3 T_i + \beta_4 M_i + \beta_5 X_i + \epsilon_{i2}$$

Mediation Analysis with Pretreatment Control Variables

Mechanism	Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME)	% of Total Effect Mediated
Moral Obligation	0.115 (0.061, 0.172)	42.3%
Burden-Sharing	0.036 (0.001, 0.088)	10.2%
High Casualties	0.005 (-0.010, 0.023)	2.0%
Financial Costs	0.001 (-0.013, 0.015)	0.3%
Terrorism	-0.002 (-0.019, 0.015)	-0.7%†
Spillover	-0.003 (-0.023, 0.016)	-1.2%†
Economic Loss	-0.003 (-0.020, 0.014)	-1.0%†
Reputation	0.005 (-0.012, 0.025)	1.9%

Analysis conducted on each mediator individually using the procedure from Hicks and Tingley (2011) on regression models with observed pretreatment control variables.
95% confidence intervals in parentheses. NB: * denotes p< .1; ** p<.05; and *** p< .01.
†Some values are negative because the effect of the mediator acts in the opposite direction of the effect of the humanitarian treatment.

C6. Sensitivity Analysis

The previous analysis indicates that moral obligation mediates a significant amount of the effect of humanitarian intervention on support; however, it only controls for observed pretreatment covariates. To meet the sequential ignorability assumption, the results must also be robust to the presence of unobserved variables that influence both the presence of the mediator and support for intervention. Because these variables are unobserved, we cannot directly test this aspect of the sequential ignorability assumption. Instead, we employed the sensitivity analysis outlined in Imai et al. (2011, 776) and Hicks and Tingley (2011, 5–7) to provide evidence that, given our results, a high and unlikely degree of correlation between the error terms in the mediation models is required for the true ACME to be zero.[14] These results increase our confidence that the sequential ignorability assumption is not violated in this case.

Results of Sensitivity Analysis

	Model 1 (No Controls)	Model 2 (Pretreatment Controls)
Sensitivity Parameter	0.9	0.7
Residual Variance	0.81	0.49
Total Variance	0.41	0.12

Table reports the correlation between the error terms (sensitivity parameter), residual variance, and total variance explained by an unobserved confounder under which the ACME equals zero.

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[14] The sensitivity analysis procedure offered in the mediation package accommodates either a binary mediator or outcome variable, but not both. We use the categorical measure of support to conduct this analysis.

D. Strategic Rationale Follow-Up Experiment

D1. Strategic Rationale Results

The humanitarian and FPR scenarios used in experiment one were designed to vary only the primary objective of military action—protecting foreign civilians versus expelling invaders. However, one criticism could be that the difference in support between the scenarios could also be explained by the absence of an explicit strategic rationale for action in the FPR case. In the humanitarian scenario, respondents were explicitly told that intervention was necessary because "civilians, many of whom are women and children, are systematically being massacred," creating a clear humanitarian interest. By contrast, the original FPR scenario only informed respondents that the president wanted to intervene "to expel the invaders." While respondents are likely to assume that leaders push for military action because national interests are at stake, the specific security interests were not made explicit to parallel the corresponding humanitarian interests.

To determine whether this divergence in explicit rationales affected either support for intervention or the mechanisms of support, we conducted a follow up experiment that presented respondents with the original humanitarian and FPR scenarios, as well as an FPR scenario in which the national interests that drive FPR interventions were made explicit—"The U.S. president has called for the U.S. military to intervene to expel the invaders because the acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable to the U.S." This experiment was fielded in August 2016 to a convenience sample of 310 U.S. adults using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Follow-up questions then gauged individuals' support for the intervention, agreement that "The U.S. has security interests at stake in this scenario," and sense of moral obligation. The results show that the difference between the humanitarian and FPR scenarios is not an artifact of the scenario wording. As figure D2 illustrates, there is not a statistically significant difference between support for the original and revised FPR scenarios and support for humanitarian intervention remains significantly higher than either of the FPR alternatives. Additionally, while the more explicit FPR scenario increased the perception that U.S. security interests were at stake from 56 percent to 65 percent, this increase is not statistically significant. Finally, participants' sense of moral obligation remains significantly higher in the humanitarian condition compared to either of the FPR alternatives. 82 percent of respondents in the humanitarian scenario, 64 percent in the new FPR scenario, and 57 percent in the original FPR scenario reported a sense of moral obligation. The difference between the humanitarian scenario and each of the FPR scenarios is statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level. Combined, these findings provide no evidence that the absence of clear strategic interests in the FPR scenario confounds either the relative level of support or respondents' sense that the U.S. has a moral obligation to intervene.

D2. Support and Mechanisms of Alternative FPR Scenario

	HI	FPR	FPR New		HI	FPR	FPR New		HI	FPR	FPR New
	Support				Security Interest				Moral Obligation		

D3. Strategic Rationale Survey Instrument

The following survey was fielded August 10-13, 2016, with 310 participants recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

Humanitarian Treatment
An authoritarian leader abroad has deployed troops to a neighboring country. The neighbor is unable to defend its civilians. The U.S. president has called for the U.S. military to intervene because civilians, many of whom are women and children, are systematically being massacred.

Original FPR Treatment
An authoritarian leader abroad has deployed troops to a neighboring country. The neighbor is unable to defend itself. The U.S. president has called for the U.S. military to intervene to expel the invaders.

New FPR Treatment
An authoritarian leader abroad has deployed troops to a neighboring country. The neighbor is unable to defend itself. The U.S. president has called for the U.S. military to intervene to expel the invaders because the acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable to the U.S.

Support/Opposition
To what extent would you support or oppose this intervention?
- Strongly support
- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

Perceived Security Interests
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
The U.S. has security interests at stake in this scenario.
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Moral Obligation
To what extent do you agree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Gender
What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Education
What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?
- None or grades 1-8
- High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
- High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
- Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school
- Some college, no 4-year degree (including 2 year Associate Degree)
- College graduate (BS, BA, or other 4-year degree)
- Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college

Party Identification
Generally speaking, when it comes to political parties in the United States, how would you best describe yourself?
- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat
- Independent close to Democrat
- Independent (close to neither)
- Independent close to Republican
- Not very strong Republican
- Strong Republican

Income
For statistical purposes, last year (2013) what was your total household income from all sources, before taxes?
- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 to under $20,000
- $20,000 to under $30,000
- $30,000 to under $40,000
- $40,000 to under $50,000
- $50,000 to under $75,000
- $75,000 to under $100,000
- $100,000 to under $150,000
- $150,000 or more

D4. Strategic Rationale Sample Demographics (MTurk)

Variable	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Party ID		
Democrat	155	50.00%
Independent	59	19.03%
Republican	96	30.97%
Education		
High School	39	12.58%
College	222	71.61%
Post-Graduate	49	15.81%
Gender		
Male	138	44.52%
Female	171	55.16%
	N=310	

Appendix E. Experiment Two

E1. Summary of Treatment Wording

1: FPR Baseline	A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **gain power and resources**. The U.S. President has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is unable to defend itself**.
2: FPR Low Help	A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **gain power and resources**. The U.S. President has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is unable to defend itself**. If the U.S. intervenes, **the U.S.** would provide substantial resources to cover most of the cost of the mission.
3: FPR High Help	A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **gain power and resources**. The U.S. President has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is unable to defend itself**. If the U.S. intervenes, **other countries** would provide substantial resources to cover most of the cost of the mission.
4: FPR Low Reputational Costs	A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **gain power and resources**. The U.S. President has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is unable to defend itself**. Whether or not the U.S. intervenes **will not** affect the U.S.'s reputation as a strong actor **or** make it harder for the U.S. to achieve its future foreign policy goals.
5: FPR High Reputational Costs	A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **gain power and resources**. The U.S. President has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is unable to defend itself**. Whether or not the U.S. intervenes **will** affect the U.S.'s reputation as a strong actor **and** make it harder for the U.S. to achieve its future foreign policy goals.
6: HI Baseline	A country sent is military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **massacre civilians, including innocent women and children**. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is suffering a humanitarian crisis**.
7: HI Low Help	A country sent is military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **massacre civilians, including innocent women and children**. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is suffering a humanitarian crisis**. If the U.S. intervenes, **the U.S.** would provide substantial resources to cover most of the cost of the mission.
8: HI High Help	A country sent is military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **massacre civilians, including innocent women and children**. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is suffering a humanitarian crisis**. If the U.S. intervenes, **other countries** would provide substantial resources to cover most of the cost of the mission.
9: HI Low Reputational Costs	A country sent is military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **massacre civilians, including innocent women and children**. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is suffering a humanitarian crisis**. Whether or not the U.S. intervenes **will not** affect the U.S.'s reputation as a strong actor **or** make it harder for the U.S. to achieve its future foreign policy goals.
10: HI High Reputational Costs	A country sent is military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to **massacre civilians, including innocent women and children**. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack **is suffering a humanitarian crisis**. Whether or not the U.S. intervenes **will** affect the U.S.'s reputation as a strong actor **and** make it harder for the U.S. to achieve its future foreign policy goals.

E2. Experiment Two Survey Instrument

The following survey was fielded February 25-28, 2015, with 1,500 participants recruited through YouGov.

Background information given to all respondents.

We are going to describe a situation the United States has faced many times in the past and could likely face again in the future. For scientific validity, the situation is general, and is not about any specific country in the news today. After describing the situation, we will ask a few questions.

Control/Baseline

A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to [gain power and resources OR to massacre civilians, including innocent women and children].   The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders, because the country under attack is [unable to defend itself OR suffering a humanitarian crisis]. In this situation, do you support or oppose using the U.S. military to push out the invaders?

Strongly support / Somewhat support / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose

Help/Burden-Sharing

A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to [gain power and resources OR to massacre civilians, including innocent women and children]. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders, because the country under attack is [unable to defend itself OR suffering a humanitarian crisis]. If the U.S. intervenes, [the U.S. OR other countries] would provide substantial resources to cover most of the cost of the mission. In this situation, do you support or oppose using the U.S. military to push out the invaders?

Strongly support / Somewhat support / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose

Resolve

A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to [gain power and resources OR to massacre civilians, including innocent women and children]. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders, because the country under attack is [unable to defend itself OR suffering a humanitarian crisis]. Whether or not the U.S. intervenes will [not] affect the U.S.'s reputation as a strong actor [and/or] make it harder for the U.S. to achieve future foreign policy goals. In this situation, do you support or oppose using the U.S. military to push out the invaders?

Strongly support / Somewhat support / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose

All respondents are then asked the following questions.

1. Morality Mediator

To what extent do you agree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?

Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Somewhat disagree / Strongly disagree

2. Expected Strategy/Cost

If the U.S. intervenes, in addition to airstrikes, how likely it is that the United States will put military troops on the ground?

Very unlikely / Somewhat unlikely / Somewhat likely / Very likely

3. Security
When you thought about whether or not the U.S. should intervene in the scenario described above, which of the following were the most important reasons for your decision to support or oppose the intervention? Check any that apply.

- Whether or not the invading country's actions threaten my country's security.
- Whether or not the invading country's actions threaten the security of other countries.

4. Altruism:

In the past month, have you volunteered time or donated money to any non-profit organization or charity?
a) Donated money
b) Volunteered time
c) Volunteered time and donated money
d) None of the above

5. Hawkishness:
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "The use of military force usually makes problems worse."

Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Strongly disagree / Strongly disagree

E3. Experiment Two Sample Demographics (YouGov)

Variable	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Party ID		
Democrat	558	37.20%
Independent	451	30.07%
Republican	361	24.07%
Other/Not sure	130	8.66%
Education[15]		
High School	644	42.93%
College	708	47.20%
Post-Graduate	148	9.87%
Gender		
Male	665	44.33%
Female	835	55.67%
Income		
Low	718	47.87%
Middle	498	33.20%
High	62	4.13%
Prefer Not to Say	222	14.80%
	N=1,500	

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[15] Based on the highest level of education the respondent entered.

E4. Experiment Two Probit Analysis of Humanitarian Intervention, Demographic Characteristics, and Support for War

Beyond the context of multilateralism and reputational costs, we also examine the effect of humanitarian intervention relative to other factors known to influence individuals' support for war. As the table below suggests, standard demographic factors such as gender, education, news interest, and age do not have a strong impact on support for war. On the other hand, consistent with the initial analysis, those who agreed that the intervention was a moral obligation were more inclined to support the use of force. Perhaps not surprisingly, respondents who were hawks, disagreeing that military force usually makes things worse, were more likely to support the use of force. Attitudes about the cost of intervention, however, had no impact on support for war, suggesting a degree of imprudence at odds with existing literature (Jentleson and Britton 1998). Lastly, respondents engaged in charitable giving of their time or money were less likely to support intervention. However, the interaction between altruism and the humanitarian treatment was not significant, which suggests that support for humanitarian intervention is not driven by people who are magnanimous in general.

Effect of Humanitarian Intervention and Demographics on Support

	Coefficient	Std error	t-stat
Humanitarian Treatment	.27	.10	.006***
Party Identification (1=Dem; 2=Rep; 3=Ind)	.005	.04	.89
Gender (1=male)	-.05	.09	.60
Altruism	-.44	.20	.02**
Altruism*humanitarian	.02	.27	.94
Hawk	.26	.09	.005***
Age	.02	.03	.49
Education	-.05	.03	.11
News interest	-.005	.03	.89
Morality	2.18	.09	.00***
Cost	-.01	.05	.81
Log Likelihood	-495.94		
Pseudo-R2	.44		
Observations	1500		

Table reports results of a probit regression model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. NB: *p < 0.1, **p<0.05, *** p < 0.01

E5. Experiment Two Comparison of Binary and Categorical Measures of Support

**Descriptive Comparison of Binary and Categorical Support by Treatment Scenario**

	Foreign Policy Restraint	*Humanitarian Intervention*	*Effect of Humanitarian Intervention*
Binary Support			
0: Oppose	33%	24%	-9%
1: Support	67%	76%	+9%
Categorical Support			
1: Strongly Oppose	9%	8%	-1%
2: Somewhat Oppose	23%	16%	-7%
3: Somewhat Support	44%	48%	+4%
4: Strongly Support	23%	28%	+5%
N	757	743	

Binary and Categorical Comparison of Means by Treatment Scenario

	Foreign Policy Restraint	*Humanitarian Intervention*	*Effect of Humanitarian Intervention*
Binary Support	0.68	0.76	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Categorical Support	2.82	2.97	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
N	154	160	

Table reports results of two-tailed comparisons of means. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

E6. Experiment Two Moderation Analysis

Effects of Humanitarian Intervention by Potential Moderators

Humanitarian intervention does not moderate the effects of either multilateral help or reputational costs on the use of force. As the figures show, the size of the gap between low and high (i.e., the distance between the solid and dashed lines) for both multilateral help and reputational costs does not substantively change across the FPR and humanitarian intervention scenarios.

E7. Experiment Two Mediation Analysis

See appendix C5 for a description of the method and models used to conduct the mediation analysis.

Results of Mediation Analysis without Controls

Explanation for Support	Mechanisms of Support	Indicator	Treatment Effect	Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME)	% of Total Effect Mediated
Norms	Morality	Moral obligation	6.1%**	0.047 (0.014, 0.08)	50.1%
Cost Signals	Expected Strategy	Boots on the ground	1.6%	-0.001 (0.003, 0.001)	-.8%†
Strategic Signals	Concerns about security	Own security	-2.1%	-0.000 (-0.002, 0.001)	-.1%†
		Allies' security	-3.2%	-0.001 (-0.005, 0.002)	-1.5%†
Analysis conducted on each mediator individually using the procedure from Hicks and Tingley (2011) and regression models without controls for pretreatment covariates. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. NB: * denotes p< .1; ** p<.05; and *** p< .01 †Some values are negative because the effect of the mediator acts in the opposite direction from the effect for the humanitarian treatment.					

Results of Mediation Analysis Controlling for Pretreatment Covariates

Explanation for Support	Mechanisms of Support	Indicator	Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME)	% of Total Effect Mediated
Norms	Morality	Moral obligation	0.072 (0.040, 0.101)	62.3%
Cost Signals	Expected Strategy	Boots on the ground	-0.000 (-0.003, 0.002)	-0.3%†
Strategic Signals	Concerns about security	Own security	0.000 (-0.002, 0.003)	0.4%
		Allies' security	-0.006 (-0.013, 0.001)	-6.2%†
Analysis conducted on each mediator individually using the procedure from Hicks and Tingley (2011) and regression models with controls for observed pretreatment covariates. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. NB: * denotes p< .1; ** p<.05; and *** p< .01 †Some values are negative because the effect of the mediator acts in the opposite direction from the effect for the humanitarian treatment.				

E8. Sensitivity Analysis

See Appendix C6 for a description of the sensitivity analysis procedure. As before, the results indicate that an unobserved confounder would need to create a high and unlikely correlation (0.9) between the error terms in the mediation models for the ACME to be zero.

Results of Sensitivity Analysis

	Model 1 (No Controls)	Model 2 (Pretreatment Controls)
Sensitivity Parameter	0.9	0.9
Residual Variance	0.81	0.81
Total Variance	0.45	0.26

Table reports the correlation between the error terms (sensitivity parameter), residual variance, and total variance explained by an unobserved confounder under which the ACME equals zero.

Appendix F. Perceptions of Threat Follow-Up Experiment

F1. Perceptions of Threat Results

  In addition to multilateral help and reputation costs, support for humanitarian intervention could also be moderated by respondents' perception of the threat posed by the target state. Specifically, individuals could assume that states willing to massacre civilians are inherently more threatening, confounding the effect of moral obligation. To rule out this alternative mechanism, we again conducted a follow-up survey that presented participants with the baseline humanitarian and FPR scenarios outlined above and then asked whether they agreed that, "This scenario presents a threat to the United States." This survey was fielded in August 2016 to a convenience sample of 199 U.S. adults using Amazon's Mechanical Turk.

  The results show that respondents' perceptions of the threat were roughly equal across the FPR and humanitarian scenarios—39 percent of individuals in the FPR scenario and 41 percent of respondents in the humanitarian scenario thought the situation posed a threat to the U.S. There is thus no evidence that threat perception differs significantly between HI and FPR cases or confounds the sense of moral obligation we find to be consistently and significantly associated with support for humanitarian intervention. However, in line with moral mechanism argument, the experimental findings again show that a significantly higher number of respondents associated a sense of moral obligation with the humanitarian intervention scenario. In the humanitarian intervention scenario, 76 percent of respondents agreed that the U.S. had a moral obligation to intervene, compared to 63 percent of respondents in the FPR scenario (p=0.0632). Combined, these results provide evidence that support for humanitarian intervention is driven by a sense of moral obligation rather than a change in respondents' perception of the threat posed to the United States.

F2. Perceptions of Threat and Moral Obligation by Treatment

F3. Perceptions of Threat Survey Instrument

The following survey was fielded August 10-13, 2016, with 199 participants recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

Humanitarian
A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to massacre civilians, including innocent women and children. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack is suffering a humanitarian crisis.

Foreign Policy Restraint
A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to gain power and resources. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders because the country under attack is unable to defend itself.

Support
In the situation, do you support or oppose using the U.S. military to push out the invaders?
- Strongly support
- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

Perception of Threat
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
This scenario presents a threat to the United States.
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Moral Obligation
To what extent do you agree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?
- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Demographic Questions
See questions from "Strategic Rationale" instrument.

F4. Perceptions of Threat Sample Demographics (MTurk)

Variable	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Party ID		
Democrat	92	46.23%
Independent	41	20.06%
Republican	66	33.17%
Education[16]		
High School	27	13.57%
College	132	66.33%
Post-Graduate	40	20.10%
Gender		
Male	85	42.71%
Female	113	56.78%
	N=199	

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[16] Based on the highest level of education the respondent entered.

Appendix G. Experiment Three

G1. Experiment Three Survey Instrument

The following survey was fielded June 7-14, 2015, with 408 participants recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

Background information given to all respondents.

We are going to describe a situation the United States has faced many times in the past and could likely face again in the future. For scientific validity, the situation is general, and is not about any specific country in the news today. After describing the situation, we will ask a few questions.

FPR/HI Scenario

A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country. The invading country's military is being used to [gain power and resources OR to massacre civilians, including innocent women and children]. The U.S. president has proposed that the U.S. military intervene to push out the invaders, because the country under attack is [unable to defend itself OR suffering a humanitarian crisis]. In this situation, do you support or oppose using the U.S. military to push out the invaders?

Strongly support / Somewhat support / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose

All respondents are then asked the following questions.

1. Morality Mechanisms
When you thought about whether or not the U.S. should intervene in the scenario described earlier, which of the following were the **most important** reasons for your decision to support or oppose the intervention? Check any that apply.

[Order of response options is randomized]

- Whether or not harm would be done to weak or vulnerable civilians.
- Whether or not the perpetrators would be able to get away with violating human rights.
- Whether or not the invading country's actions caused disorder within international society.
- Whether or not a failure to intervene would betray my country's values and identity.
- Whether or not the invading country's actions violate my expectations for how a civilized country should act.
- Whether or not the invading country's actions threaten my country's security.
- Whether or not the invading country's actions threaten the security of other countries.
- None of the above

3. How likely do you think it would be that the U.S. would apply each of the following military strategies for the intervention?

a. No-fly zone that prevents enemy aircraft from flying in the region.
b. Airstrikes carried out by unmanned drones.
c. Airstrikes carried out by manned aircraft.
d. Boots on the ground to expel the invader from the territory

Very unlikely / Somewhat unlikely / Somewhat likely / Very likely

4. In the last twelve months, have you done any of the following? (check any that apply)

Donated money to a charity / Volunteered your time / Volunteered time and donated money / None of the above

5. Gender
What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

6. Education
What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?
- None or grades 1-8
- High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
- High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
- Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school
- Some college, no 4-year degree (including 2 year Associate Degree)
- College graduate (BS, BA, or other 4-year degree)
- Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college

7. Party Identification
Generally speaking, when it comes to political parties in the United States, how would you best describe yourself?
- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat
- Independent close to Democrat
- Independent (close to neither)
- Independent close to Republican
- Not very strong Republican
- Strong Republican

8. Income

For statistical purposes, last year (2013) what was your total household income from all sources, before taxes?

- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 to under $20,000
- $20,000 to under $30,000
- $30,000 to under $40,000
- $40,000 to under $50,000
- $50,000 to under $75,000
- $75,000 to under $100,000
- $100,000 to under $150,000
- $150,000 or more

9. Hawkishness

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

10. Attention to Politics

How often do you get your news about politics from TV, radio, newspaper, or online outlets?

- A couple of times a month or less
- Once a week
- 2-3 times a week
- Daily
- Several times a day

G2. Experiment Three Sample Demographics (MTurk)

Variable	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Party ID		
Democrat	218	53.56%
Independent	82	20.15%
Republican	107	26.29%
Education[17]		
High School	54	13.24%
College	291	71.32%
Post-Graduate	63	15.44%
Gender		
Male	214	52.45%
Female	194	47.55%
Income		
Low	159	39.07%
Middle	165	40.54%
High	83	20.39%
	N=408	

[17] Based on the highest level of education the respondent entered.

G3. Experiment Three Comparison of Binary and Categorical Measures of Support

Descriptive Comparison of Binary and Categorical Support by Treatment Scenario

	Foreign Policy Restraint	*Humanitarian Intervention*	*Effect of Humanitarian Intervention*
Binary Support			
0: Oppose	36%	17%	-19%
1: Support	64%	83%	+19%
Categorical Support			
1: Strongly Oppose	8%	5%	-3%
2: Somewhat Oppose	29%	12%	-17%
3: Somewhat Support	54%	55%	+1%
4: Strongly Support	9%	28%	+19%
N	203	205	

Binary and Categorical Comparison of Means by Treatment Scenario

	Foreign Policy Restraint	*Humanitarian Intervention*	*Effect of Humanitarian Intervention*
Binary Support	0.64	0.83	0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Categorical Support	2.65	3.05	0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
N	203	205	

Table reports results of two-tailed comparisons of means. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

G4. Mediation Analysis

See appendix C5 for a description of the method and models used to conduct the mediation analysis.

Results of Mediation Analysis

Average Casual Mediation Effect for Morality and Security Mechanisms

Moral Mediators of Support Controlling for Other Mediators

Mechanisms of Support	Indicator	Treatment Effect	Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME)	% of Total Effect Mediated
Individual-Level	Harm to civilians	12.12%***	0.028 (0.005, 0.058)	14.19%
	Perpetrators able to get away with human rights abuse	0.5%	0.001 (-0.014, 0.016)	0.72%
Community-Level	Disorder within international society	-1.3%	0.000 (-0.005, 0.005)	0.00%
	Betray values and identity	1.6%	0.003 (-0.007, 0.013)	1.58%
	Violate expectations of civilized country	2.6%	0.000 (-0.006, 0.006)	0.06%
Treatment effect column reports the result of comparison of means tests of the effect of the humanitarian intervention treatment on the presence of each potential mechanism. Mediation analysis conducted on each mediator individually using the procedure from Hicks and Tingley (2011) and logistic regressions that include all potential moral mediators as control variables 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. NB: * denotes p< .1; ** p<.05; and *** p< .01.				

Correlation Matrix for Moral Mediators

	Harm	Human Rights	Values	Disorder	Civilized Behavior
Harm	1.00				
Human Rights	0.30	1.00			
Values	0.17	0.21	1.00		
Disorder	0.20	0.32	0.27	1.00	
Civilized Behavior	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.29	1.00

Table reports the correlation coefficients for each pair of potential mediators.

Mediation Analysis Controlling for Pretreatment Covariates

Mechanisms of Support	Indicator	Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME)	% of Total Effect Mediated
Individual-Level	Harm to civilians	0.043 (0.012, 0.081)	23.15%
	Perpetrators able to get away with human rights abuse	-0.005 (-0.026, 0.016)	-2.75%†
Community-Level	Disorder within international society	0.001 (-0.012, 0.015)	0.38%
	Betray values and identity	0.004 (-0.009, 0.020)	2.33%
	Violate expectations of civilized country	0.006 (-0.005, 0.021)	3.59%

Analysis conducted on each mediator individually using the procedure from Hicks and Tingley (2011) and logistic regression models with pretreatment control variables.
95% confidence intervals in parentheses. NB: * denotes $p < .1$; ** $p<.05$; and *** $p< .01$.
†Some values are negative because the effect of the mediator acts in the opposite direction of the effect of the humanitarian treatment.

G5. Sensitivity Analysis

See Appendix C6 for a description of the sensitivity analysis procedure. The results indicate that an unobserved confounder would need to create a correlation of 0.4 between the error terms in the mediation models for the ACME to be zero. While these results require a lower level of correlation than previous experiments for the ACME to be zero, the correlation required to undo the significant result is roughly equal to the examples cited by Imai et al. (2011, 776).

Results of Sensitivity Analysis

	Model 1 (No Controls)	Model 2 (Pretreatment Controls)
Sensitivity Parameter	0.5	0.4
Residual Variance	0.25	0.16
Total Variance	0.19	0.08

Table reports the correlation between the error terms (sensitivity parameter), residual variance, and total variance explained by an unobserved confounder under which the ACME equals zero.

Appendix H. Moral Foundations and Party Identifications

Effect of Humanitarian Intervention on Moral Foundations, by Partisan ID

Percentage of Respondents Who Reported Concern with Each Moral Foundation			
	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Harm			
Humanitarian Intervention	73 (64, 81)	63 (50, 76)	68 (54, 83)
FPR	64 (55, 71)	43 (30, 57)	57 (42, 71)
Difference	9 (-4, 21)	20 (1, 38)**	12 (-9, 32)
Human Rights			
Humanitarian Intervention	56 (47, 65)	50 (37, 63)	39 (24, 55)
FPR	54 (45, 64)	55 (41, 68)	41 (26, 55)
Difference	2 (-12, 15)	-5 (-24, 14)	-1 (-23, 20)
Values/Identity			
Humanitarian Intervention	27 (19, 36)	44 (31, 58)	26 (12, 40)
FPR	24 (16, 32)	40 (26, 53)	32 (18, 46)
Difference	4 (-8, 15)	5 (-14, 24)	-6 (-25, 14)
Disorder			
Humanitarian Intervention	44 (35, 53)	30 (17, 42)	39 (24, 55)
FPR	38 (29, 47)	45 (32, 59)	41 (26, 55)
Difference	6 (-7, 19)	-16 (-34, 2)*	-1 (-23, 20)
Civilized			
Humanitarian Intervention	35 (26, 43)	46 (33, 60)	24 (10, 37)
FPR	37 (28, 46)	23 (11, 34)	34 (20, 48)
Difference	-3 (-15, 10)	24 (6, 41)**	-10 (-30, 9)
Security			
Humanitarian Intervention	43 (34, 53)	57 (44, 71)	53 (37, 69)
FPR	66 (57, 75)	75 (64, 87)	64 (49, 78)
Difference	-22 (-35, -9)***	-18 (-36, -1)**	-11 (-32, 10)
Others' Security			
Humanitarian Intervention	37 (28, 46)	50 (37, 63)	47 (31, 63)
FPR	50 (41, 60)	55 (41, 68)	55 (40, 69)
Difference	-13 (-26, 0)**	-5 (-24, 14)	-7 (-29, 14)

Table reports results from tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. N=408. Size of effect between treatment and control groups may differ slightly from reported values due to rounding. NB: * denotes p< .1; ** p<.05; and *** p< .01.

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